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Abstract 
A major goal of the EU Commission in the area of direct taxation is the introduction 
of a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) in Europe. While hardly 
discussed in the literature, such a system would limit national discretion over tax 
depreciation. In a sample of up to 47 countries, we find that the probability of a 
tax reform that improves the depreciation allowances increases, if the 
macroeconomic situation is weak. This suggests that changes in depreciation 
allowances are used as a fiscal instrument for stabilization. A common consolidated 
tax base deprives national governments from implementing investment incentives 
via accelerated depreciation. This paper discusses the possible implementation of a 
hybrid system that combines features of formula apportionment and separate 
accounting. Such a hybrid system may substantially mitigate transfer pricing 
problems and other tax planning issues, whilst preserving national discretion over 
depreciation allowances.  
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1 Introduction 
A major goal of the EU Commission in the area of direct taxation is the 
introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) in Europe. 
The introduction of a CCCTB could end 27 different definitions of the corporate 
tax base within the EU, leading to a significant simplification for European 
multinational firms. Together with the consolidation of European profits, it would 
allow for cross-border loss offsets and would significantly reduce the opportunities 
of multinational firms for tax planning.  
Over the last years, various approaches for a comprehensive tax system in Europe 
have been discussed (Bettendorf, Devereux, van der Horst, de Mooij, 2010), but 
eventually one stood up above the others: the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB). In order to develop a concrete design of the CCCTB, a special 
working group was established, and it has subsequently published more than 60 
working papers. Finally, on the 16th of March in 2011, the European Commission 
adopted a proposal for a Council Directive for a European CCCTB and forwarded 
it to the Council, the European Parliament and to all national parliaments (Vascega 
and van Thiel, 2011). In such a CCCTB system, the tax base of European company 
groups would be uniformly defined and individual member countries that host parts 
of the company group would receive parts of the consolidated tax base based on 
formula apportionment (FA). The formula of the draft directive puts a third of its 
weight on sales, a third on tangible assets, and payroll and the number of employees 
would receive the weight one sixth, each. However, political progress towards FA 
and CCCTB remains difficult to achieve and separate accounting (SA) continues to 
prevail. Under SA, each member state uses its own definition of corporate profits 
and the arm’s length principle is used to allocate corporate profits between affiliated 
corporations.  
As a reaction to the difficult political process of arriving at an agreed upon FA, 
the commission presented a new draft directive in autumn 2016. The new proposal 
contains a two-step design. A first step implies compulsory harmonized corporate 
tax base for company groups in the EU. Only a later second step would introduce 
formula apportionment (EU Commission, 2016). 
In a globalized world with more and more multinational activities, the current 
arm’s length principle, according to which the taxable profit of each affiliate of a 
corporate group is calculated separately, is increasingly difficult to apply. Between 
affiliates of a company group, all kinds of transactions occur, such as payments for 
intellectual property, interest on intra-company loans, sales of intermediate and 
finished goods, etc. The arm’s length principle introduces the assumption that for 
tax purposes the correct fees and transfer prices are the ones that would have been 
agreed on by independent companies. Yet, in practice, multinational activity is 
often connected to special advantages not available to stand-alone firms and recent 
theoretical and empirical contributions to international trade suggest that 
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multinational firms are systematically more productive than domestic firms. These 
factors aggravate the problem of using the arm’s length benchmark.  
Within Europe, a CCCTB with FA would reduce multinational firms’ incentive 
to shift corporate income from high-tax to low-tax countries in order to reduce their 
overall tax burden (Hines, 1999; Clausing, 2003). Groups of companies that are 
taxed on a consolidated basis would lose the incentive to use tax minimizing 
financial structures, use license fees to reduce taxable profits in high-tax 
jurisdictions, or misprice their intra-company sales of intermediate goods.1  
At the same time, FA could increase the distortions created by tax rate 
differentials. Multinationals face an incentive to shift factors, which enter the 
formula that apportions the total company tax base to participating countries, to 
low-tax jurisdictions. Whereas under SA tax rate differentials may create more 
distortions in the financial sphere (transfer prices, financial structure), under FA 
they may create more distortions for real economic variables. In particular, they 
may distort the location of capital and employees as well as the ownership structure 
of firms. 
This paper discusses a method to strike a balance between national sovereignty 
and subsidiarity, on the one hand, and the coordination of corporate taxes to limit 
profit shifting, tax avoidance, and administrative costs, on the other hand. It 
proposes and discusses a hybrid system that combines features of FA and SA.  
Essentially, the profit of a corporation consists of different categories of both 
income and costs. Different categories of income may be defined as sales income, 
interest income, patent income, income from leasing etc. Total cost can be 
decomposed into costs associated with wages, physical intermediates, interest, 
depreciation, consultancy, use of intellectual property, provisions for deferred 
wages, etc. We show that, in principle, for each of these income and cost categories, 
there is a possible choice between either allowing a national definition or switching 
to a common EU definition. If cost and income categories with national definitions 
are allocated based on SA, while cost and income categories that receive a 
harmonized EU definition are allocated using FA, a gradual move from one system 
to the other is possible, eventually resulting in a hybrid system. A main objective 
of the paper is to lay out how such a hybrid approach may work, in which some 
costs (e.g., depreciation) are exempted from FA and continue to be nationally 
defined. 
Such a gradual or hybrid approach may not only facilitate political support by 
allowing time to better understand FA, but may also have economic advantages if 
there are trade-offs that affect the net benefits of FA differently for various 
categories of incomes and cost. For example, the abolition of national depreciation 
rules in a currency union may deprive national governments of a potentially useful 
                                       
 
1 There is debate about the extent to which FA reduces tax competition in tax 
rates. See, e.g., Pethig and Wagener (2007).   
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policy instrument to stimulate the economy, whereas accepting a uniform EU 
definition of patent income, may have a comparatively lower cost.  
Indeed, several EU member states have provided more generous allowances for 
investment during the financial crisis. Austria introduced a special 30% allowance 
for investments purchased in 2009 and 2010. For the years 2009 and 2010, Germany 
allowed the use of a 25% geometric depreciation instead of the flat line depreciation 
that had been laid down shortly before in the tax reform act 2008. Also, Latvia 
increased the asset value for depreciation purposes, and France increased its 
maximum rate for declining-balance depreciation.  Furthermore, in order to boost 
investment, Finland introduced temporary accelerated depreciations that were in 
force in 2009 and 2010; during this period firms could deduct depreciation 
allowances calculated at a rate that was double the standard rate.2  
Switching over to strict FA would take away national discretion in setting 
depreciation allowances. This has been discussed in selected contributions. 
Kiesewetter, Steigenberger and Stier (2014, p. 4) think that for political reasons a 
“substantial number of national tax allowances and incentives are highly likely to 
survive the harmonization of the tax base”.  Gammy et al. (2005, p. 17) recognize 
that the corporate tax and its depreciation allowances may be used as a policy tool 
to stimulate investment, but do not discuss the problems that may come with giving 
up this tool.  
Empirically, accelerated depreciation has been shown to be a powerful tool to 
spur investment (Ohrn, 2016). Against this background, one question addressed in 
this paper is the question of whether a loss of discretion comes at an economic cost. 
For this reason, the paper reviews changes of depreciation allowances in the past. 
To make the case that, in the past, depreciation allowances empirically have been 
influenced by the macroeconomic situation we start with an empirical section. 
Within a panel data set for up to 47 countries, Section 2 of the paper provides 
evidence that in the past governments were more likely to improve allowances when 
the macro economy was weak. This finding suggests that the measure has been used 
as a fiscal instrument to stimulate the economy. Motivated by this observation, a 
further question is whether the implementation of a hybrid system, in which 
depreciation may still be set on the national level, could be a solution. In principle, 
numerous hybrid systems could be devised as a multinational firm’s pre-tax profit 
can be thought of as a sum of different revenue and loss categories and each category 
could be either left to national taxation or joint taxation. Thus, linear combinations 
between formula apportionment and separate accounting are worth considering. 
Section 3 discusses the implications for the cost of capital in a particular hybrid 
system, in which national investment incentives prevail. Section 4 provides a 
                                       
 
2 2*25% = 50% for machinery and 2*7% = 14% for industrial buildings. From 
2012 to 2016, Finland reintroduced accelerated depreciation allowances. 
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discussion of alternatives to national depreciation allowances in a formula 
apportionment system. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.    
2 Changes of Depreciation Allowances in the Past 
While the common monetary policy suggests an increased role for national fiscal 
policies, the harmonization of depreciation allowances across member states would 
take away an instrument that may be useful to react to asymmetric shocks. Whether 
the loss of national depreciation rules comes at a cost depends on the extent to 
which governments, if allowed, are indeed using this instrument for discretionary 
fiscal policy. The more frequently countries are using changes in depreciation 
allowances as an instrument of fiscal policy, the greater the potential loss from 
harmonization may be. Conversely, if changes in the past have not been used to 
react to macroeconomic situations, a loss of this instrument may seem acceptable. 
Therefore, this section provides a description of how often the generosity of 
depreciation for machinery and industrial buildings has changed in the past. In 
addition, it asks to what extent these changes of national depreciation allowances 
have been related to the specific macroeconomic situation. So far, the motivation 
behind changes of depreciation allowances has been largely neglected in the 
empirical literature.3  
The review of the pattern of changes in depreciation allowances starts from the 
data collected by the Oxford University Centre (CBT) Tax Database.4 The database 
contains information on corporate tax rates and the generosity of depreciation 
allowances for up to 47 countries, including 24 EU countries. We take advantage of 
the descriptions for industrial buildings and plants plus machinery. For these assets 
it contains information about the corresponding depreciation method (straight line, 
declining balance, declining balance with a switch to straight line or any variation 
thereof) and depreciation rates.5 Although the previously mentioned information is 
available for some countries, data information on depreciation and corporate taxes, 
for at least 19 countries, starts in 1983 (allowing the calculations of annual changes 
for those countries beginning in 1984) and ends in 2016 with data on 47 countries.6  
                                       
 
3 Egger and Raff (2015) look at tax base broadening in tax competition, but do 
not discuss changes as potentially stabilizing macro fiscal policies.  
4 Available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/faculty-research/tax/publications/data 
(Sept. 2017). 
5 All information applies to 1st of January of a given year, i.e., if the tax year is 
different than the calendar year, any reforms introduced in a given tax year that 
started after 1st of January will not appear in the data until the following year. 
6 Countries with tax rate and depreciation information at least since 1983 include: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States. Additional countries included at least since 2008: 
Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, New 
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The identification of improvements or deteriorations in depreciation allowances 
requires a precise definition of what should be considered an improvement or 
deterioration. In general, the investors’ economic benefit from the depreciation 
allowance is a function of inflation, interest, and tax rates. Therefore, in the case 
of fundamental changes, say a switch from linear to digressive depreciation, the 
definition could depend on these other variables. As our aim is to focus on changes 
of depreciation specifically, we take a simplified, pragmatic approach. For the case 
of machinery, we use as a benchmark what fraction of the total investment cost can 
be written down in the first two years when total use is assumed to be ten years.7 
If that fraction increases, we encode this as an improvement. If it decreases, we 
encode the change as a deterioration. For buildings, which are often written down 
over a tax lifetime between 15 and 50 years, we take as a benchmark the fraction 
of allowances that can be used during the first five years. 
Table 1 reports the picture that evolves from this exercise. Overall, for our 
sample, we count 50  improvements and 48 deteriorations for plant and machinery 
for a total of 1,235 country-years. Hence, changes in depreciation of these assets 
occurred in 8.1% of all years; the equivalent number for buildings is 6.2%.  
Changes in depreciation allowances are less frequent than changes in the effective 
statutory tax rate, which in the same set of countries occurred in 27.2% of all years. 
The fact that tax rates change more frequently may partly derive from the fact that 
the effective statutory tax rates are also influenced by subnational changes, whereas 
depreciation allowances are typically set on the national level only.  
 
 
                                       
 
Zealand, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
7 If an investor can choose between different depreciation schemes, we focus on 
the alternative with the fastest depreciation.  
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Table 1. Changes of Depreciation Allowances for Machinery and Buildings 
  Machinery  Buildings    
Year No. of  
Countries 
Deterio-
ration 
Improve-
ment  
Deterio-
ration 
Improve-
ment 
CT 
reduction 
CT 
increase 
1984 19 0 0 0 0 4 3 
1985 19 0 2 1 2 3 3 
1986 19 3 0 2 0 4 1 
1987 20 2 0 2 0 5 3 
1988 20 1 2 3 0 4 0 
1989 20 2 1 2 1 6 2 
1990 20 1 2 2 1 6 2 
1991 23 3 0 1 0 8 4 
1992 29 1 3 2 2 4 4 
1993 31 2 2 2 2 7 3 
1994 34 1 3 1 1 11 3 
1995 35 1 0 0 1 5 5 
1996 38 2 1 2 1 4 5 
1997 41 0 0 0 2 6 2 
1998 41 2 6 3 2 10 5 
1999 41 1 2 1 2 5 4 
2000 41 2 0 3 0 13 4 
2001 41 2 1 1 1 10 1 
2002 42 4 1 2 1 13 1 
2003 42 2 5 2 1 6 4 
2004 42 1 1 1 1 10 1 
2005 47 2 2 3 2 16 2 
2006 47 2 2 2 1 12 0 
2007 47 2 1 1 0 9 1 
2008 47 2 1 1 0 11 1 
2009 47 1 6 1 1 11 0 
2010 47 0 0 1 0 8 1 
2011 47 4 0 3 0 5 4 
2012 47 0 0 0 0 10 4 
2013 47 3 1 2 1 7 5 
2014 47 0 0 0 0 6 4 
2015 46 0 1 0 1 6 2 
2016 45 0 1 0 0 7 1 
Source: Oxford University Centre (CBT) Tax Database. We added corrections to account 
for Finland’s investment promotion (2009-2010 and 2013-2015) based on communications 
with two national experts and for France’s temporary measures in 2009 and 2016 based on 
PWC (2017). We also added selected tax rate information from Mintz and Weichenrieder 
(2010). Years 1981-1983 are not reported, but up to 12 country-year observations are included 
in regressions below.  
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Figure 1a. Types of Tax Reforms that Imply Changes in Depreciation 
(Machinery) 
 
 
Figure 1b. Types of Tax Reforms that Imply Changes in Depreciation (Buildings) 
 
 
Note: The reform types differ depending on whether a narrowing or broadening of the tax 
base was associated with a tax rate cut or increase in the same year. Base narrowing without 
change in the tax rate, BN; base broadening without tax rate changes, BB; tax cut cum base 
broadening, TCCBB; tax cut cum base narrowing, TCCBN; tax increase cum base 
broadening, TICBB; tax increases cum base narrowing, TICBN.  
 
Figure 1a illustrates how in our sample of countries the 98 changes in 
depreciation allowances for machinery are connected to corporate tax rate changes. 
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The category with most changes (33) implies a base narrowing (more generous 
allowance) associated with no change in the tax rate (BN), followed by 27 cases of 
base broadening without tax rate changes (BB). Cases of tax cut cum base 
broadening (TCCBB) account for 18 changes. Less important are tax cuts cum base 
narrowing (TCCBN), tax increases cum base broadening (TICBB), and tax 
increases cum base narrowing (TICBN). Figure 1b illustrates a similar pattern for 
the 74 changes in depreciation allowances for buildings. Again, around 60% of all 
changes are not associated with tax rate changes.  
How do the changes in the depreciation allowances relate to the macroeconomic 
conditions? One way to investigate this is to look at the narrative put forward at 
the time of the relevant changes in depreciation. Indeed, in many instances 
stimulation of the business cycle and/or investment and employment are named as 
the reasons behind improvements of depreciation for machinery.8  While sometimes 
the business cycle is also referred to as a motive when depreciation allowances are 
cut back, another often cited motivations are financing needs or compensating 
measures to secure tax revenues.9  
A more systematic way to gauge the role of changes in depreciation is to ask to 
what extent these changes are associated with unemployment and/or underutilized 
capacities. For this, we employ various discrete choice models in which we try to 
explain the probability of a change in depreciation by the general macroeconomic 
situation, captured by either the unemployment rate or the output gap.   
Our first variable of interest is the dummy CHANGE, which indicates whether 
the generosity of depreciation for investment in machinery is different from the 
previous year. Table 2a reports results for machinery and Table 2b for buildings. 
In each of these tables, columns (1) to (4) report simple logit regressions of 
CHANGE on the unemployment rate UE, the lag of the unemployment rate, L.UE, 
the output gap, GAP, and the lag of the output gap, L.GAP.10 Descriptive statistics 
for the regressions are reported in Appendix A. The alternative use of the lagged 
macro-variables is suggested by a possible policy lag whereby this year’s tax change 
is in response to the previous year’s macroeconomic situation and was accordingly 
legislated in the previous year. The lagged macro-variables also avoid problems of 
reverse causality that may result if changes in depreciation allowances have an 
immediate impact on the macroeconomic situation. Note that whereas a higher 
unemployment rate indicates a more difficult macroeconomic situation, a more 
positive output gap indicates a better situation. Therefore, positive signs for UE 
                                       
 
8 For example, the Austrian Ministry of Finance stated support of the business 
cycle as the reason for the 2009 change (https://www.bmf.gv.at/steuern 
/Beg_Konjunkturpaket_2009_VorblErl.pdf?5te3iw, retrieved January 2018)  
9 See Kremer and Ruf (2008) for the German 2008 reform.   
10 The output gap is based on yearly IMF World Economic Outlook data and a 
HP filter ( = 100). Unemployment rates are also taken from IMF data. While GAP 
and UE are, as expected, significantly negatively correlated, the size of the 
correlation coefficient (10%) is modest.  
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and L.UE and negative signs for GAP and L.GAP would support the premises that 
a weak economy triggers policy changes.  
In addition to the macro variables, we add a time trend, YEAR.11 To avoid that 
the depreciation changes in 2009, which were induced by the financial crisis, are 
driving our results, we add a dummy for that year, YEAR2009. Finally, we also 
add a dummy (POST2008) for the post-2008 period, as legislators and ministries of 
finance may have been kept busy with financial market regulation and may have 
had a lower productivity in designing tax reforms. Although these time effects are 
usually significant, our results do not rely on their inclusion. Columns (5) and (6) 
of Table 2a and 2b report conditional (fixed effects) logit regressions that use 
countries as groups. While this leads to dropping countries from the sample that 
did not experience a change in depreciation, the results are closely comparable to 
the simple logit results.  
The results in Table 2a indicate that the probability of depreciation changes for 
machinery is higher if (lagged) unemployment (GAP, L.GAP) is high or the lagged 
output gap (L.GAP) is low. The current output gap is not significant, although the 
sign is the same as for L.GAP. While results are reported in coefficients, the row 
Marg. Eff. reports marginal effects for our main variables of interest. Taking a 
concrete example, the value .0058 in column (4) means that a one-point increase in 
the unemployment rate, on average, increases the probability of a policy change by 
.58 percentage points. At the same time, the average probability is close to eight 
percent, and the sample average of the unemployment rate is also about eight 
percent. The elasticity based on the delta method in column (4) is .59.  
Table 2a also reports a time trend (YEAR), which is insignificant. At the same 
time, the YEAR2009 dummy is significantly positive, yet the POST2008 dummy is 
significantly negative. The first sign reflects the high policy activity at the height 
of the financial crisis. The second result may be seen as a confirmation that 
legislative bodies and finance ministries in these years were preoccupied with non-
tax related issues, such as financial regulation, therefore, tax changes were scarce.  
Table 2b reports the results that derive from looking at changes of the allowances 
for buildings. While the coefficients of UE and L.UE are significant and positive as 
before, the results for GAP and L.GAP as measures of the macroeconomic situation 
are generally insignificant. This may result from measurement problems of the 
output gap or with a larger attention on the unemployment rate. The dummy for 
2009, except in column (5), is also insignificant. The somewhat weaker results seem 
to indicate that changes in the allowances for machinery are more important fiscal 
instruments than changes in the allowances for buildings.  
  
                                       
 
11 Including year fixed effects instead of the trend would drop a substantial 
number of observations because some outcomes would be completely explained by 
the year dummy.  
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Table 2a. Macroeconomic Situation and the Probability of Depreciation Changes 
(Machinery)    
Logit Logit Logit Logit Clogit Clogit  
UE 0.075 
     
 
[4.03]*** 
     
GAP 
 
-0.005 
    
  
[-0.63] 
    
L.GAP 
  
-0.018 
  
-0.019 
   
[-2.22]** 
  
[-2.23]** 
L.UE 
   
0.081 0.135 
 
    
[4.30]*** [5.16]*** 
 
Marg. Eff. 0.0053 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0058 0.0030 -0.0001 
 [3.99]*** [-0.63] [-2.20]** [4.22]*** [0.04] [-0.59] 
YEAR -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 0.002 -0.01 
 [-1.39] [-1.36] [-1.49] [-1.57] [0.11] [-0.62] 
       
YEAR2009 1.715 1.612 1.873 1.872 2.186 2.016 
 
[4.76]*** [4.23]*** [4.52]*** [5.24]*** [6.09]*** [4.61]*** 
POST2008 -0.966 -0.849 -0.766 -0.929 -1.281 -0.906 
 
[-2.35]** [-2.00]** [-1.81]* [-2.25]** [-3.13]*** [-2.25]** 
Obs.  1231 1231 1231 1231 971 971 
Log 
likelihood 
-325.05 -331.55 -329.14 -323.87 -241.36 -244.32 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 
Note: Endogenous variable, CHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for machinery at start 
of year is different from previous year, and zero otherwise. Robust z values in parenthesis. 
*,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Constants not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
 
 
The endogenous variable CHANGE is used in Tables 2a and 2b does not 
differentiate between improvements and deteriorations of depreciation allowances. 
For this reason, the endogenous variable used in Tables 3a and 3b, OCHANGE, 
allows for three alternatives; 1 = deterioration, 2 = no change, 3 = improvement. 
The reported outcomes are for six multinomial logit models in both tables.  
Interestingly, the results, in particular those using the concurrent or the lagged 
unemployment rate, suggest that a bad macroeconomic situation may not only 
increase the probability of a change towards more generosity, but it also increases 
the probability for a deterioration. While this result may be surprising, one should 
keep in mind that our sample of 47 countries are quite heterogeneous. Especially 
when it comes to countries with limited fiscal space, these countries may not be 
able or willing to give up tax revenues in difficult times. A simple measure of the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249512 
 
11 
 
 
market’s evaluation of fiscal space is a country’s credit rating. For this reason, we 
also run regressions concentrating on country years during which the respective 
country has a rating in the prime segment of Moody’s (Aaa to A3).  
 
Table 2b. Macroeconomic Situation and the Probability of Depreciation Changes 
(Buildings)    
Logit Logit Logit Logit Clogit Clogit  
UE 0.084 
     
 
[3.89]*** 
     
GAP 
 
-0.009 
    
  
[-1.11] 
    
L.GAP 
  
-0.014 
  
-0.014 
   
[-1.45] 
  
[1.30] 
L.UE 
   
0.084 0.194 
 
    
[3.73]*** [3.84]*** 
 
Marg. Eff. 0.00461 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0046 2.24e-11 -9.85e-08 
 [3.90]*** [-1.09] [-1.41] [3.75]*** [0.45] [-0.82] 
YEAR -0.038 -0.036 -0.037 -0.040 -0.027 -0.041 
 [-1.92]* [-1.79]** [-1.89]* [-2.06]** [-1.43] [1.92]* 
       
YEAR2009 0.519 0.405 0.616 0.668 1.087 0.681 
 
[1.15] [0.85] [1.13] [1.49] [2.43]** [1.11] 
POST2008 -0.707 -0.586 -0.532 -0.657 -1.042 -0.616 
 
[-1.15] [-0.92] [-0.84] [-1.06] [-1.81]* [1.05] 
Obs.  1228 1228 1228 1228 919 919 
Log 
likelihood 
-264.3 -264.47 -270.68 -269.99 -184.9 -191.05 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.05 
Note: Endogenous variable, CHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for buildings at start 
of year is different from previous year, and zero otherwise. Robust z values in parenthesis. 
*,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Constants not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of Country-Year Observations across Ratings  
 
 
Note: Ratings as applied at start of respective country-year. 1 = Aaa, 2 = Aa1, 3 = Aa2, 4 
= Aa3, 5 = A1, 6 = A2, 7 = A3, 8 = Baa1, 9 = Baa2, 10 = Baa3, 11 = Ba1, 12 = Ba2, 13 
= Ba3, 14 = B1, 15 = B2, 16 = B3, 17 = Caa1, 18 = Caa2, 19 = Caa3, 20 = Ca.  
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of country-year observations across the 
different Moody ratings. In total, concentration on the prime segment drops 309 
country-years. Indeed, this sample of well-rated countries used in columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 3a yields insignificant results for deteriorations, but continues to imply 
a significant correlation between the macroeconomy and the probability for 
depreciation improvements. These results suggest that sufficient fiscal space is 
elementary for countries to use depreciation allowances as a fiscal instrument, in 
order to boost the economy.  
Table 3b reports the results for the depreciation of buildings.  Again, using the 
full sample, a higher unemployment seems to foster both improvements and 
deteriorations of depreciations. However, the results for deteriorations turn 
insignificant, if the sample is restricted to the more creditworthy countries.  
Investigating the changes in tax depreciation is motivated by the fact that a 
CCCTB may restrict fiscal policies of participating EU countries. For this reason, 
Appendix B, as a robustness check, presents regressions corresponding to those of 
Tables 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b, but excludes non-EU countries. The results are very 
closely comparable to the ones presented above. Despite smaller numbers of 
observations, significance levels are generally preserved, sometimes even improved.  
Our last step in the investigation of the connection between depreciation changes 
and the macroeconomy is to look at the possibility of joint reforms of depreciation 
and taxes. As illustrated by Figure 1, changes of depreciation allowances may or 
may not be connected to corporate tax rate changes. Because tax rate changes may 
be considered an outcome variable, we avoided using them as right-hand variables 
in the regressions above.  
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Table 3a. Improvements versus Deterioration of Depreciation (Machinery) 
 
Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit 
low risk 
Mlogit 
low risk 
Deterioration 
UE 0.071 
   
0.060  
 
[3.22]*** 
   
[1.28]  
GAP  0.005     
 
 [0.45]     
L.GAP    -0.011   
 
   [-0.96]   
L.UE   0.072 
[3.32]*** 
  0.0642 
[1.34] 
Marg. Eff.   
 
0.0026 
[2.91]*** 
0.0002 
[0.52] 
0.0026  
[2.94]*** 
-0.0004 
[-0.84] 
0.0020 
[1.12] 
0.0021 
[1.17] 
Improvement 
UE 0.079    0.102  
 [3.15]***    [3.10]***  
GAP  -0.016     
  [-1.89]*     
L.GAP    -0.026   
    [-2.98]***   
L.UE   0.091   0.120 
   [3.46]***   [3.74]*** 
Marg.  0.0028 -0.0006 0.0032 -0.0009 0.0037 0.0043 
Eff. [3.09]*** [-1.91]* [3.36]*** [-2.83]*** [3.60]*** [4.44]*** 
Obs. 1231 1231 1231 1231 750 750 
Log 
likelihood 
-390.06 -395.59 -388.77 -393.70 -231.99 -230.42 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Note: Endogenous variable, OCHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for machinery at 
start of year has deteriorated from the previous year, two if the same, and three if improved. 
Robust z values in parenthesis. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. Constant and coefficients for YEAR, YEAR2009, and POST2008 are not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap and L.UE, as applicable.  
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Table 3b. Improvements versus Deterioration of Depreciation (Buildings) 
 
Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit 
low risk 
Mlogit 
low risk 
Deterioration       
UE 0.082 
   
0.067  
 
[2.96]*** 
   
[1.34]  
GAP  -0.004     
 
 [-0.34]     
L.GAP    -0.013   
 
   [-0.97]   
L.UE   0.081   0.060 
 
  [2.77]***   [1.10] 
Marg. Eff.   
 
0.0029 
[2.73]*** 
-0.0001 
[-0.29] 
0.0029 
[2.54]** 
-0.0005 
[-0.88] 
0.0024 
[1.23] 
0.0022 
[1.02] 
Improvement       
UE 0.099    0.144  
 [3.15]***    [2.52]**  
GAP  -0.020     
  [-1.98]**     
L.GAP    -0.018   
    [-1.36]   
L.UE   0.100   0.1368 
   [3.19]***   [2.69]*** 
Marg. Eff.  0.0020 -0.0004 0.0021 -0.0004 0.0025 0.0024 
 [2.56]*** [-2.11]** [2.57]*** [-1.34] [2.21]** [2.27]** 
Obs. 1199 1199 1199 1199 731 731 
Log 
likelihood 
-309.84 -316.30 -309.97 -315.96 -181.38 -181.82 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Note: Endogenous variable, OCHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for buildings at 
start of year has deteriorated from the previous year, two if the same, and three if improved. 
Robust z values in parenthesis. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. Constant and coefficients for YEAR, YEAR2009, and POST2008 are not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
 
One possibility is to formulate a multinominal logit model that consists of the 
following comprehensive choice set: O = No reform (baseline option); TI = No 
depreciation change, corporate tax increase; TC = No depreciation change, 
corporate tax cut; TCCBN = Improvement of depreciation, corporate tax cut; 
TICBN = Improvement of depreciation, corporate tax rate cut; BN. Improvement 
of depreciation, no change in the corporate tax rate; TCCBB = Deterioration of 
depreciation, increase in the corporate tax rate; TCCBN = Deterioration of 
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depreciation, decrease in the corporate tax rate; BB = Deterioration of depreciation, 
no change in the corporate tax rate.  
Table 4a reports results for the full sample and Table 4b reports the highly rated 
country-years (Moody’s A3, or better). In each table, we report results using either 
L.GAP or L.UE as variables describing the macroeconomy. The first two columns 
examine machinery, the last two columns focus on the depreciation of buildings.  
Although some results appear, not all reforms are made more likely by a weak 
macroeconomic situation. We tend to see an increased likelihood for a tax cut cum 
base narrowing (TCCBN) and for a base narrowing without tax rate change (BN). 
At the same time, we find no evidence in the full sample that a high unemployment 
rate decreases the likelihood of a deterioration of depreciation that comes with a 
tax increase (TICBB). For buildings, the results even suggest that a high 
unemployment increases the likelihood for TICBB. Such a tax reform may be 
considered inadequate to improve the economy, but could be motivated by budget 
requirements. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the sign of L.UE 
for machinery changes from being insignificant to being significantly negative, once 
countries with a low rating are excluded from the sample and the sign for buildings 
changes. Finally, high unemployment also seems to increase the likelihood of reforms 
that imply a tax cut cum base broadening (TCCBB), but this result loses statistical 
significance in the sample of highly rated countries when we look at machinery and 
turns to being significantly negative for buildings.  
Taken together, our empirical investigation suggests that macroeconomic factors 
affect the likelihood of a change in depreciation allowances. The macroeconomic 
situation may be proxied by different variables. In our regressions, the 
unemployment rate seems to be a better predictor than our measure of the output 
gap. Improvements of depreciation are more likely in a weak economy. While 
impairments of depreciations may also happen more often in below average 
situations, this effect tends to be driven by countries with a poor credit standing 
and thus these measures may be rationalized by budgetary requirements rather than 
efforts to stimulate the economy.12  
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
12 One may note that macroeconomic literature discusses whether in high-debt 
countries a consolidation of the budget can provide a positive macroeconomic 
stimulus. However, several papers seem to imply that such surprising expansionary 
effects, if at all, derive from expenditure cuts rather than from tax increases. For a 
recent contribution to this literature, see Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2015).  
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Table 4a. Reform Types (Multinominal Logit)  
 Machinery Machinery Buildings Buildings 
TI = No depreciation change, increase in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.001 
[-1.00] 
 -0.006 
[-0.61] 
L.UE 0.011 
[0.33] 
 0.015 
[0.49] 
 
TC = No depreciation change, decrease in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.008 
[-1.30] 
 -0.007 
[-1.11] 
L.UE -0.032 
[-1.33] 
 -0.029 
[-1.20] 
 
TCCBN = Improvement of the depreciation, decrease in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.027 
[-1.44] 
 -0.048 
[-2.25]** 
L.UE 0.114 
[2.43]** 
 0.140 
[2.63]*** 
 
TICBN = Improvement of the depreciation, increase in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.017 
[-0.67] 
 -0.044 
[-1.63] 
L.UE 0.118 
[3.01]*** 
 0.019 
[0.47] 
 
BN = Improvement of the depreciation, no change in the corporate tax rate 
L.GAP  -0.031 
[2.84]*** 
 -0.008 
[-0.50] 
L.UE 0.068 
[2.59]*** 
 0.079 
[2.54]** 
 
TICBB = Deterioration of the depreciation, increase in the corporate tax rate 
L.GAP  -0.009 
[-0.22] 
 -0.033 
[-1.13] 
L.UE 0.0946 
[1.11] 
 0.144 
[2.40]** 
 
TCCBB = Deterioration of the depreciation, decrease in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.015 
[-0.71] 
 -0.017 
[-0.97] 
L.UE 0.079 
[2.65]*** 
 0.065 
[1.71]* 
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BB = Deterioration of the depreciation, no change in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.013 
[-0.84] 
 -0.008 
[-0.49] 
L.UE 0.053 
[1.24] 
 0.059 
[1.11] 
 
Obs.  1228 1228 1226 1226 
Log likelihood -1270.80 -1276.87 -1990.28 -1997.16 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Note: Endogenous variable, OUTCOME, is zero in our baseline line specification, in which 
there is no change either in the corporate tax rates nor in the depreciation allowances for 
machinery (columns 1 and 2) and buildings (columns 3 and 4). The variable can also take 
the value from one to eight, as presented in the table. Robust z values in parenthesis. *,** 
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Constant and coefficients for 
YEAR, YEAR2009, and POST2008 are not reported.  
 
 
Table 4b. Reform Types for Highly Ranked Countries (Multinominal Logit)  
 Machinery Machinery Buildings Buildings 
TI = No depreciation change, increase in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  0.001 
[0.10] 
 -0.002 
[-0.15] 
L.UE 0.002 
[0.03] 
 0.005 
[0.12] 
 
TC = No depreciation change, decrease in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.022 
[-2.12]** 
 -0.022 
[-2.17]** 
L.UE -0.043 
[-1.14] 
 -0.038 
[-1.07] 
 
TCCBN = Improvement of the depreciation, decrease in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.021 
[-0.51] 
 0.062 
[-1.48] 
L.UE 0.159 
[1.67]* 
 0.204 
[2.61]*** 
 
TICBN = Improvement of the depreciation, increase in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.032 
[-2.97]*** 
 -0.006 
[-0.84] 
L.UE 0.207 
[2.04]** 
 0.024 
[0.48] 
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BN = Improvement of the depreciation, no change in the corporate tax rate 
L.GAP  -0.037 
[-2.65]*** 
 -0.025 
[-0.69] 
L.UE 0.095 
[2.57]** 
 0.113 
[2.21]** 
 
TICBB = Deterioration of the depreciation, increase in the corporate tax rate 
L.GAP  -0.119 
[-9.06]*** 
 -0.008 
[-0.16] 
L.UE -0.378 
[-4.63]*** 
 0.135 
[1.44] 
 
TCCBB = Deterioration of the depreciation, decrease in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.020 
[-0.56] 
 0.027 
[1.59] 
L.UE 0.063 
[1.45] 
 -0.163 
[-2.51]** 
 
BB = Deterioration of the depreciation, no change in the corporate tax rate  
L.GAP  -0.019 
[-0.82] 
 -0.017 
[-0.64] 
L.UE 0.063 
[1.08] 
 0.069 
[1.16] 
 
Obs.  750 750 750 750 
Log likelihood -749.06 -751.41 -702.50 -705.27 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Note: Endogenous variable, OUTCOME, is zero in our baseline line specification, in which 
there is no change either in the corporate tax rates or in the depreciation allowances for 
machinery (columns 1 and 2) and buildings (columns 3 and 4). The variable can also take 
the value from one to eight, as presented in the table. Robust z values in parenthesis. *,** 
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Constant and coefficients for 
YEAR, YEAR2009, and POST2008 are not reported.  
3 Investment Incentives under Separate Accounting, 
Formula Apportionment, and a Hybrid System 
The above empirical evidence suggests that changes of depreciation allowances 
have been used in the past as a fiscal instrument for stabilization. In this section, 
we argue that this instrument can survive in a hybrid CCCTB framework. The 
basic idea relies on the fact that profits consist of a sum of different revenue and 
cost categories. Instead of using a common formula for everything, different 
formulas for distinct components of profits are conceivable. Therefore, numerous 
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linear (hybrid) combinations of separate accounting and formula apportionment are 
possible. We leave the formal argument to Appendix C and directly concentrate on 
the case in which only one cost item is left out of formula apportionment and the 
joint tax base: the depreciation allowance.  
We concentrate on the investment incentives under a hybrid system and compare 
this situation to two reference scenarios: one in which there is no formula 
apportionment (i.e., separate accounting) and one in which the CCCTB formula is 
applied to all types of cost (i.e., formula apportionment).  
Consider a multinational operating in member states, A and B. Let the economic 
profit, 𝜋𝐴  and 𝜋𝐵 , in these two countries (before taxes) be described as  
𝜋𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴(𝐿𝐴, 𝐾𝐴) − 𝑤𝐴𝐿𝐴 − (𝑟 + 𝛿𝐴)𝐾𝐴  ; 𝜋𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵(𝐿𝐵, 𝐾𝐵) − 𝑤𝐵𝐿𝐵 − (𝑟 + 𝛿𝐵)𝐾𝐵, (3)  
where 𝛿𝐴, 𝛿𝐵 denote economic depreciation of capital in the two countries; 𝐿𝐴, 𝐿𝐵 
signify labor; 𝐾𝐴, 𝐾𝐵 are the capital variables; 𝑤𝐴, 𝑤𝐵 depict wages; and r is the 
interest rate, which captures the opportunity cost of investors. For simplicity, we 
take into account a one-period model. We capture more or less generous 
depreciation by assuming that tax law may possibly allow the deduction of a larger 
or smaller fraction 𝛼 of capital from the tax base than the one suggested by economic 
depreciation at the relevant rates (𝛿𝐴, 𝛿𝐵). Therefore, depending on the taxation 
regime, we derive different expressions for taxes due. If separate accounting is 
applied, we have 
𝑇𝑠 = 𝜏𝐴(𝜋𝐴 − 𝐾𝐴 ∙ (𝛼𝐴 − 𝛿𝐴)) + 𝜏𝐵(𝜋𝐵 − 𝐾𝐵 ∙ (𝛼𝐵 − 𝛿𝐵)) .  (4) 
Conversely, if formula apportionment is applied comprehensively to all cost 
categories, we have 
𝑇𝑐 = [𝜏𝐴 ∙ 𝜑𝐴(. ) + 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝜑𝐵(. )] ∙ (𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 − (𝐾𝐴 + 𝐾𝐵) ∙ 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛿𝐴𝐾𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝐾𝐵),  (5) 
where 𝜑𝐴(. )  and 𝜑𝐵(. ) are the fractions of the tax base allocated to countries A 
and B. These fractions are a function of the variables entering formula 
apportionment, which may comprise real capital, payroll, the number of workers 
and sales to third parties, or a combination of subsets of these variables.   
Finally, in a hybrid system, the taxes due are represented by  
𝑇ℎ = [𝜏𝐴 ∙ 𝜑𝐴(. ) + 𝜏𝐵 ∙ 𝜑𝐵(. )] ∙ (𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝐴𝐾𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝐾𝐵) − 𝜏𝐴𝛼𝐴𝐾𝐴 − 𝜏𝐵𝛼𝐵𝐾𝐵,  (6) 
In the case of separate accounting, the multinational maximizes net of tax profits 
𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 − 𝑇𝑠  and the cost of capital for the affiliate in country 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 is derived by 
the first order condition with respect to 𝐾𝑖.  
(1 − 𝜏𝑖)(𝜕𝑓𝑖 /𝜕𝐾𝑖 − 𝑟) − 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖𝛼𝑖 = 0, (7)  
which yields the cost of capital as 
𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑠𝑖 =  𝜕𝑓𝑖 /𝜕𝐾𝑖 − 𝛿𝑖 = 𝑟 + (𝛿𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖)
𝜏𝑖
1−𝜏𝑖
. (8)  
The interpretation of this expression for the cost of capital is straightforward. 
Because the financing cost is assumed to be deductible, the cost of capital equals 
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the interest rate, if tax allowance for depreciation equals economic depreciation (𝛿𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖) , but differs from the interest rate if tax allowances are more or less generous.   
Now, we turn to formula apportionment. Here, the net of tax profit is 𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 −
𝑇𝑐 , and the first order condition with respect to 𝐾𝐴  is  
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
− 𝑟 − 𝛿𝐴 − [𝜏𝐴𝜑𝐴 + 𝜏𝐵𝜑𝐵] (
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
− 𝑟 − 𝛼𝑐)  
− {
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐴 +
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐵} (𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 − (𝐾𝐴 + 𝐾𝐵 )𝛼𝑐 + 𝛿𝐴𝐾𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝐾𝐵) = 0 (8) 
 
After rearranging terms, we have for the cost of capital 
𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑐𝐴 =
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
− 𝛿𝐴 = 𝑟 +
𝛿𝐴−[𝜏𝐴𝜑𝐴+𝜏𝐵𝜑𝐵]𝛼𝑐
𝑍
− 𝛿𝐴  
                    −
1
𝑍
{
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐴 +
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐵} (𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 − (𝐾𝐴 + 𝐾𝐵 )𝛼𝑐 + 𝛿𝐴𝐾𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝐾𝐵) (9) 
Here, 𝑍 ≔ [1 − 𝜏𝐴𝜑𝐴 − 𝜏𝐵𝜑𝐵]. In the event that 𝛿𝐴 = 𝛼𝑐, the second and third terms 
on the RHS are canceled. If, in addition, 
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐴 +
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐵 = 0, then the cost of capital 
again is equated to the interest rate. However, if the latter condition is not fulfilled, 
the cost of capital is not only a function of the tax rates and depreciation allowances, 
but also of the total pre-tax profits 𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵. Hence, unlike under SA (cf. eq. (8)), 
equating tax depreciation to economic depreciation is generally not enough to avoid 
investment distortions.  
Now, consider the cost of capital in a hybrid system in which a common tax base 
is applied to all cost and revenue components, but whereby depreciation can be 
chosen nationally. The first order condition of the multinational that maximizes net 
of tax profits is 
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
− 𝑟 − 𝛿𝐴 − [𝜏𝐴𝜑𝐴 + 𝜏𝐵𝜑𝐵] (
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
− 𝑟) + 𝜏𝐴𝛼𝐴  
− {
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐴 +
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐵} (𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝐴𝐾𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝐾𝐵) = 0 (10) 
After rearranging the terms, we receive 
𝑐𝑜𝑐ℎ𝐴 =
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
− 𝛿𝐴 = 𝑟 + (
1
𝑍
− 1) 𝛿𝐴 +
[𝜏𝐴
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
+𝜏𝐵
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝐾𝐴
]
𝑍
(𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝐴𝐾𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝐾𝐵) −
𝜏𝐴𝛼𝐴
𝑍
  (11) 
 
How does a change in the generosity of tax depreciation allowances affect the 
cost of capital in the different regimes (s, c, h)? The simplest expression is in the 
case of separate accounting.  
𝜕𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑠𝐴
𝜕𝛼𝐴
= −
𝜏𝐴
1−𝜏𝐴
 (12) 
In the case of formula apportionment, (ignoring repercussions of a change of 𝛼𝑐 
on 𝜑𝐴, 𝜑𝐵 - strictly speaking only permissible in symmetric situation) we have  
𝜕𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑐𝐴
𝜕𝛼𝑐
= −
[𝜏𝐴𝜑𝐴+𝜏𝐵𝜑𝐵]
𝑍
+
1
𝑍
{
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐴 +
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝐾𝐴
𝜏𝐵} (𝐾𝐴 + 𝐾𝐵 )𝛼𝑐 (13) 
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In the case of a symmetric situation, (𝜏𝐴 = 𝜏𝐵;  𝜑𝐴 = 𝜑𝐵), the effect on the cost of 
capital simplifies to −
𝜏𝑒
1−𝜏𝑒
, with 𝜏𝑒 = 𝜏𝐴𝜑𝐴 + 𝜏𝐵𝜑𝐵. This is equivalent to the expression 
in equation (12), but with the effective tax rate 𝜏𝑒 taking on the role of the national 
rate.  
Finally, in a hybrid system, we have 
𝜕𝑐𝑜𝑐ℎ𝐴
𝜕𝛼𝐴
= −
𝜏𝐴
𝑍
 (14) 
Again, this derivation ignores the indirect effect on 𝜑𝐴  and 𝜑𝐵  that a change in 
𝛼𝐴 may have via a change in the amounts of 𝐾𝐴  and 𝐾𝐵 . In general, a more generous 
depreciation allowance in country A will put more weight on country A (increase 
𝜑𝐴 ) and less on country B (reduce 𝜑𝐵 ). If country A has the higher (lower) tax 
rate, this will have a countervailing increasing (reinforcing negative) effect on 
𝜕𝑐𝑜𝑐ℎ𝐴
𝜕𝛼𝑐
, 
which is not represented in equations (13) and (14).13  
Unlike under formula apportionment, the denominator in equation (14) is now 
given by the national tax rate rather than the weighted tax rates of countries A 
and B. By the definition of 𝑍, the tax rate 𝜏𝐵 is still affecting the change in the cost 
of capital in country A. A low tax rate in that other country may continue reducing 
the investment stimulus, but the channel is only via the denominator of (14) and 
should therefore be lower than in the case of formula apportionment.  
As a take-home message, we have the result that a more generous depreciation 
allowance has a positive effect on investment incentives also under a hybrid system. 
This said, a hybrid system, just like formula apportionment, would introduce more 
complicated effects on the cost of capital. These effects derive if tax rates differ 
between countries and, at the same, time capital enters the formula that allocates 
profits to either high or low-tax countries.14  
   
                                       
 
13 For a discussion of weight effects from tax rate changes under traditional 
formula apportionment, see Mintz and Weiner (2003), Pethig and Wagner (2007), 
or Kari et al. (2018).  
14 A remaining remark refers to possible transfer pricing incentives in the hybrid 
system. As in a FA system, those are in general eiminated in a hybrid system. An 
exception applies if an investment good is produced in one part of the multinational, 
but sold to another part and installed there. In a hybrid system, the sales revenues 
for this transaction would be taxed at the average tax rate, while the value of the 
depreciation allowances are higher, the higher the tax rate of the investing part. 
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4 Alternatives to Accelerated Depreciation and their 
Feasibility 
In our above discussion, we have discussed changes in depreciation allowances as 
a national measure to spur investment. Conceivably, if national discretion is taken 
away, several alternatives may fill the gap.  
One possibility is to reduce the tax rate in order to encourage more investment. 
Although this would be a measure to attract investment from abroad, the effect on 
domestic investments is unclear. It cannot be ruled out that a reduction of the 
corporate income tax would reduce investment incentives via the “tax paradox”, 
namely as a lower tax rate reduces the benefit of shifting taxes into the future, local 
real investments may lose attractiveness compared to international financial 
investments (see, e.g., Sinn, 1987). Indeed, in Section 2, unlike with changes in 
depreciation allowances, we did not find a systematic correlation of changes in 
statutory corporate tax rates and the macroeconomic indicators.  
A further possible alternative is to allow national governments to introduce 
temporary investment subsidies. Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, such 
measures could very well act as a substitute to accelerated depreciation. Yet, 
practical problems should not be overlooked. One issue, in particular, applies when 
it comes to new firms. Similar to problems in the area of VAT fraud, pouring out 
money based on firms’ claims of investment up front are more susceptible to tax 
fraud than measures based on delayed taxation because new firms may take the 
money in advance and secretly leave before the investments actually are made. 
Perhaps a more important problem is the EU Commission’s state aid control. Under 
EU law, the Commission has a very strong position to interdict national measures 
having the potential to distort European trade.15 Member states are required to 
notify investment subsidies in advance and may only implement them after the 
Commission has consented. Even if the Commission policy were lenient, prior 
notification and consent would be a problem for timely stabilization measures. In 
addition, the Commission’s attitude towards national policies can hardly be 
considered lenient and in fact has been criticized for lacking reliability and 
consistency.16 Based on the fear that this may give an undue advantage to sectors 
with many female employees, the Commission, for example, has intervened against 
reduced social security payments for Italian women. On the other hand, the EU 
Commission consents to patent boxes within the EU that provide preferential tax 
treatment to income form intellectual property on the basis that such income, in 
principle, could be earned by all companies. From recent experiences, therefore, the 
proper application of investment subsidies required a substantial change in state 
                                       
 
15 Indeed, the EU Commission is not required to give any evidence that such a 
distortion actually applies.  
16 See Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2017).  
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aid control and probably a change of the treaties to yield sufficient reliability and 
effectiveness.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper has discussed a specific implication of a CCCTB in Europe, namely 
the absence of national depreciation measure to influence the macroeconomy. Given 
the absence of national monetary policies in the Eurozone, many economists hold 
that the role of fiscal policies to react to idiosyncratic national shocks is particularly 
prominent. Therefore, the abolition of national depreciation measures may be 
particularly costly.  
Against this background, the paper reviews the past experience of changes in 
depreciation allowances and finds a correlation between the macroeconomic 
situation and the probability of changes in depreciation rules. This evidence 
together with the various changes during the height of the recent financial crisis 
suggest that this policy instrument has been used in the past.  
The paper argues that a hybrid system, in which national depreciation rules 
prevail despite formula apportionment, is plausible. The last version of the 
Commission proposal recommends an allowance for corporate equity, which, 
effectively, would act as if there is an immediate deduction of investment outlays 
(EU Commission, 2016). Against this point of comparison, leaving depreciation to 
the government could not be more generous, leaving little concern about a race to 
the bottom in which countries strive to obtain the maximum deduction permitted. 
While immediate deduction would be allowed, such a benchmark, obviously, is not 
considered problematic by the Commission proposal.  
An alternative to preserving national discretion over depreciation would be to 
allow for national investment subsidies. Given the recent discussion about the 
reliability and consistency of EU state aid processes, such a solution would probably 
also require a common framework. Unlike in the case of open subsidies, accelerated 
depreciation has a clearly defined upper limit: immediate deduction. This may be 
an advantage over investment subsidies.  
One open issue is that a better understanding may be required of the fiscal 
spillover effects between a member state that choses a national subsidy or a national 
special depreciation and the subsequent effects on its partner countries. Whereas 
the CCCTB always leaves the tax rate as an instrument for tax competition, giving 
additional leeway for choosing depreciation is complicating the picture. We leave 
this for future research.   
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5a. Summary Statistics for Table 2a (Machinery).  
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
CHANGE 1231 0.0796 0.2708 0 1 
UE 1231 8.0644 4.7138 0.5 27.8 
L.UE 1231 8.0483 4.6934 0.5 27.8 
GAP 1231 -0.5366 13.0907 -54.2374 63.9433 
L.GAP 1231 -0.1976 13.2916 -54.2374 63.9433 
YEAR2009 1231 0.0382 0.1917 0 1 
POST2008 1231 0.3030 0.4597 0 1 
YEAR 1231 2002.333 8.9538 1981 2016 
 
Table 5b. Summary Statistics for Table 2b (Buildings).  
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
CHANGE 1228 0.0603 0.2381 0 1 
UE 1228 8.0591 4.7174 0.5 27.8 
L.UE 1228 8.0466 4.6985 0.5 27.8 
GAP 1228 -0.5391 13.1059 -54.2374 63.9433 
L.GAP 1228 -0.2018 13.3070 -54.2374 63.9433 
YEAR2009 1228 0.0383 0.1919 0 1 
POST2008 1228 0.3037 0.4601 0 1 
YEAR 1228 2002.333 8.9079 1981 2016 
 
Table 6a. Summary Statistics for Table 3a (Machinery).  
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
OCHANGE_Mach 1231 1.9984 0.2823 0 3 
UE 1231 8.0644 4.7138 0.5 27.8 
L.UE 1231 8.0483 4.6936 0.5 27.8 
GAP 1231 -0.5366 13.0907 -54.2374 63.9433 
L.GAP 1231 -0.1976 13.2916 -54.2374 63.9433 
YEAR2009 1231 0.0382 0.1917 0 1 
POST2008 1231 0.3030 0.4597 0 1 
YEAR 1231 2002.333 8.9538 1981 2016 
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Table 6b. Summary Statistics for Table 3b (Buildings).  
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
OCHANGE_Build 1199 1.9833 0.2480 0 3 
UE 1199 8.0256 4.6782 0.5 27.8 
L.UE 1199 8.0129 4.6565 0.5 27.8 
GAP 1199 -0.4431 13.1331 -54.2374 63.9433 
L.GAP 1199 -0.1337 13.2518 -54.2374 63.9433 
YEAR2009 1199 0.0350 0.1839 0 1 
POST2008 1199 0.3061 0.4611 0 1 
YEAR 1199 2002.418 8.9934 1981 2016 
 
 
Table 7a. Summary Statistics for Table 4a. 
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
OUTCOME 1228 0.9007 1.7501 0 8 
UE 1228 8.0693 4.7182 0.5 27.8 
L.UE 1228 8.0541 4.6974 0.5 27.8 
GAP 1228 -0.5414 13.1001 -54.2374 63.9433 
L.GAP 1228 -0.2413 13.2546 -54.2374 63.9433 
YEAR2009 1228 0.0383 0.1919 0 1 
POST2008 1228 0.3037 0.4601 0 1 
YEAR 1228 2002.377 8.9172 1981 2016 
 
Table 7b. Summary Statistics for Table 4b. 
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
OUTCOME_B 750 0.8427 1.6980 0 8 
UE 750 7.1084 3.8944 0.5 24.88 
L.UE 750 7.1469 3.9444 0.5 24.88 
GAP 750 0.2613 10.7876 -31.1914 41.3955 
L.GAP 750 -0.0348 11.1671 -32.4512 41.3955 
YEAR2009 750 0.044 0.2052 0 1 
POST2008 750 0.308 0.4620 0 1 
YEAR 750 2003.209 8.2128 1984 2016 
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Appendix B. Robustness Checks 
This appendix reproduces Tables 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b, but restricts the sample to the 
24 available EU countries in our dataset.  
 
Table 2aEU. Macroeconomic Situation and the Probability of Depreciation 
Changes (Machinery)    
Logit Logit Logit Logit Clogit Clogit  
UE 0.093 
     
 
[4.9]*** 
     
GAP 
 
-0.014 
    
  
[-0.96] 
    
L.GAP 
  
-0.030 
  
-0.027 
   
[-1.91]** 
  
[-1.78]* 
L.UE 
   
0.108 0.110 
 
    
[6.65]*** [2.93]*** 
 
Marg. Eff. 0.0075 -0.0011 -0.0024 0.0085 0.0004 -0.0006 
 [5.62]*** [-0.95] [-1.91]** [7.19]*** [0.98] [-0.34] 
YEAR -0.033 -0.042 -0.040 -0.035 -0.011 -0.020 
 [-1.28] [-1.65]* [-1.63]* [-1.38] [-0.40] [-0.74] 
       
YEAR2009 1.911 1.707 2.285 2.195 2.393 2.403 
 
[5.15]*** [3.99]*** [3.80]*** [5.87]*** [4.96]*** [3.68]*** 
POST2008 -0.3188 0.025 0.101 -0.286 -0.307 -0.098 
 
[-0.52] [0.05] [0.55] [-0.48] [-0.46] [0.17] 
Observations 552 552 552 552 429 429 
Log 
likelihood 
-159.53 -163.19 -161.34 -157.96 -120.13 -120.98 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Note: Endogenous variable, CHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for machinery at start 
of year is different from previous year, and zero otherwise. Robust z values in parenthesis. 
*,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Constants not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
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Table 2bEU. Macroeconomic Situation and the Probability of Depreciation 
Changes (Buildings)    
Logit Logit Logit Logit Clogit Clogit  
UE 0.136 
     
 
[4.81]*** 
     
GAP 
 
-0.015 
    
  
[-0.66] 
    
L.GAP 
  
-0.019 
  
-0.020 
   
[-0.71] 
  
[-0.68] 
L.UE 
   
0.133 0.222 
 
    
[5.03]*** [3.12]*** 
 
Marg. Eff. 0.0078 -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0076 1..36e-10 -2.59e-07 
 [8.03]*** [-0.65] [-0.70] [7.18]*** [0.46] [-0.53] 
YEAR -0.049 -0.063 -0.064 -0.056 -0.039 -0.068 
 [-1.42] [-1.95]** [-1.96]* [-1.66]* [-1.23] [-2.03]** 
       
YEAR2009 0.955 0.579 0.904 1.233 1.509 0.894 
 
[2.78] [1.15] [1.02] [3.84]*** [3.89]*** [0.95] 
POST2008 -0.106 0.459 0.528 0.074 -0.031 0.690 
 
[-0.11] [0.53] [0.62] [0.08] [-0.03] [0.73] 
Observations 552 552 552 552 376 376 
Log 
likelihood 
-121.25 -128.38 -128.07 -121.49 -82.93 -88.28 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.05 
Note: Endogenous variable, CHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for buildings at start 
of year is different from previous year, and zero otherwise. Robust z values in parenthesis. 
*,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Constants not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
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Table 3aEU. Improvements versus Deterioration of Depreciation (Machinery) 
 
Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit 
low risk 
Mlogit 
low risk 
Deterioration 
UE 0.087 
   
0.045  
 
[2.91]*** 
   
[0.78]  
GAP  -0.013     
 
 [-0.74]     
L.GAP    -0.043   
 
   [-1.77]*   
L.UE   0.093 
[3.14]*** 
  0.065 
[1.17] 
Marg. 
Eff.   
 
0.0039 
[2.62]*** 
0.0006 
[-0.73] 
0.0041 
[2.60]*** 
-0.0020 
[-1.74]* 
0.0020 
[0.67] 
0.0028 
[0.98] 
Improvement 
UE 0.102    0.085  
 [2.75]***    [1.84]**  
GAP  -0.0135     
  [-0.93]     
L.GAP    -0.014   
    [-1.41]   
L.UE   0.128   0.128 
   [3.95]***   [2.99]*** 
Marg. 
Eff.  
0.0036 -0.0005 0.0045 -0.0004 0.0030 0.0046 
 [2.49]** [-0.89] [3.59]*** [1.26] [1.75]* [2.83]*** 
Obs. 552 552 552 552 415 415 
Log 
likelihoo
d 
-191.74 -195.47 -190.00 -193.06 -143.07 -141.37 
Pseudo 
R2 
0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Note: Endogenous variable, OCHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for machinery at 
start of year has deteriorated from the previous year, two if the same and three if improved. 
Robust z values in parenthesis. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. Constant and coefficients for YEAR, YEAR2009, and POST2008 are not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
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Table 3bEU. Improvements versus Deterioration of Depreciation (Buildings) 
 
Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit 
low risk 
Mlogit 
low risk 
Deterioration       
UE 0.135 
   
0.102  
 
[3.52]*** 
   
[1.97]**  
GAP  -0.002     
 
 [-0.10]     
L.GAP    -0.022   
 
   [-0.67]   
L.UE   0.132   0.102 
 
  [3.68]***   [1.94]* 
Marg. Eff.   
 
0.0055 
[3.86]*** 
-0.0001 
[-0.05] 
0.0054 
[3.47]*** 
-0.0009 
[-0.63] 
0.0041 
[1.70]* 
0.0041 
[1.67]* 
Improvement       
UE 0.156    0.1879  
 [2.75]***    [2.65]**  
GAP  -0.043     
  [-1.33]     
L.GAP    -0.0123   
    [-0.33]   
L.UE   0.152   0.181 
   [3.11]***   [3.12]*** 
Marg. Eff.  0.0028 -0.0008 0.0027 -0.0002 0.0029 0.0028 
 [2.24]** [-1.50] [2.43]** [0.760] [2.36]** [2.43]** 
Obs.  537 537 537 537 403 403 
Log 
likelihood 
-141.50 -148.29 -141.73 -148.68 -101.96 -102.28 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.08 
Note: Endogenous variable, OCHANGE, is one if depreciation allowance for buildings at 
start of year has deteriorated from the previous year, two if the same and three if improved. 
Robust z values in parenthesis. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. Constant and coefficients for YEAR, YEAR2009, and POST2008 are not reported. 
Marg. Eff. reports the average marginal effect of UE, GAP, L.Gap, and L.UE, as applicable.  
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Appendix C. A Basic Framework for Thinking about a 
Hybrid System  
The total cost of an affiliate a located in country A may be decomposed into 𝛾 =
1 … 𝐺 different components; each of these components may be subject to different 
definitions. One possible definition could be the one used by country A. 
Alternatively, there could be a uniform EU definition for the various cost 
components. Hence, the effective size of a cost component 𝛾 for subsidiary a may 
either be 𝐶𝑎,𝐴
𝛾
 or 𝐶𝑎,𝐸𝑈
𝛾
. A vector of G indicator variables 𝑣𝛾 may be used to denote 
whether the cost category is left in the national domain (𝑣𝛾 = 0) or in the 
harmonized FA domain (𝑣𝛾 = 1). A similar decomposition can be done for revenue 
types 𝜌 = 1 … 𝑄. Revenues may either follow a national definition (𝑅𝑎,𝐴
𝜌
) or a common 
European Union definition (𝑅𝑎,𝐸𝑈
𝜌
). Again, a vector of Q indicators variables 𝑖𝜌 may 
denote whether the revenue category is left in the national domain or in the 
harmonized FA domain. Hence, in a simple example of a multinational operating in 
two EU countries, A and B, the tax base 𝑃𝐴 allocated to country A is then denoted 
by 
 
𝑃𝐴 = ∑ (1 − 𝑖
𝜌)𝑅𝑎,𝐴
𝜌𝑄
𝜌=1 − ∑ (1 − 𝑣
𝛾)𝐶𝑎,𝐴
𝛾𝐺
𝛾=1  (1) 
+𝜑𝐴 (∑ 𝑖
𝜌𝑅𝑎,𝐸𝑈
𝜌𝑄
𝜌=1 + ∑ 𝑖
𝜌𝑅𝑏,𝐸𝑈
𝜌𝑄
𝜌=1 − ∑ 𝑣
𝛾𝐶𝑎,𝐸𝑈
𝛾𝐺
𝛾=1 − ∑ 𝑣
𝛾𝐶𝑏,𝐸𝑈
𝛾𝐺
𝛾=1 ),  
 
where 𝜑𝐴 is the apportionment factor that will depend on the fraction of real 
economic activity occurring in affiliate a relative to the complete company group. 
Besides the exact formula for this factor, the political process needs to decide about 
the various indicator functions. A situation in which all 𝑖’s and 𝑣’s are zero reflects 
SA, while FA is characterized by all 𝑖’s and 𝑣’s equaling one. Conversely, having 
heterogeneous values for the indicator variables implies a hybrid system that allows 
for national discretion over defining particular cost or revenue categories.  
Besides the decision on the r’s and c’s, there is the decision about the factors 
that determine 𝜑𝐴 and 𝜑𝐵. In principle, there could be differing 𝜑’s depending on 
which cost or revenue category is split up. Allocating interest expenses may make 
it more natural to use the distribution of capital across countries, whereas the 
allocation of management remunerations may suggest a stronger role for overall 
payroll as an apportionment factor. However, for simplicity, equation (1) introduces 
a common set of apportionment factors for all revenue and cost types.  
Note that a common set of apportionment factors is also reflected in the FA 
proposal by the EU. Yet, starting from the fact that company profits are derived 
from the difference between various revenue and cost items may facilitate thinking 
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out of the box. A generalized characterization of apportionment of global profits 
may be written as  
  
𝑃𝐴
′ = ∑ (1 − 𝑖𝜌)𝑅𝑎,𝐴
𝜌𝑄
𝜌=1 − ∑ (1 − 𝑣
𝛾)𝐶𝑎,𝐴
𝛾𝐺
𝛾=1  (2) 
+ ∑ 𝜑𝐴
𝜌
𝑖𝜌𝑅𝑎,𝐸𝑈
𝜌𝑄
𝜌=1 + ∑ 𝜑𝐴
𝜌
𝑖𝜌𝑅𝑏,𝐸𝑈
𝜌𝑄
𝜌=1 − ∑ 𝜑𝐴
𝛾𝑣𝛾𝐶𝑎,𝐸𝑈
𝛾𝐺
𝛾=1 − ∑ 𝜑𝐴
𝛾𝑣𝛾𝐶𝑏,𝐸𝑈
𝛾𝐺
𝛾=1  ,  
 
where the indexation of 𝜑𝐴
𝜌
 and 𝜑𝐴
𝛾
 signals that the formula to apportion different 
cost and revenue categories may differ.  
Why could it be an advantage to let the apportionment factors vary for different 
cost and revenue categories? From Hines (2010), we know that incentives for 
inefficient mergers and investments are more likely to occur if the factors do not 
appropriately explain profits across different affiliates that are subject to formula 
apportionment. For instance, imagine a profitable Swedish company whose income 
is taxed in Sweden at a very high rate. Providing that the European companies are 
required to allocate their profits among affiliates relying to a large extent on the 
location of employment, the profitable Swedish company will then have an incentive 
to acquire another company in a low-tax country with a large labor force (in spite 
of being unprofitable). In this case, the Swedish profit might be attributed to the 
low-tax country where it will be subject to less taxes. The above-mentioned example 
illustrates how the formula apportionment could create incentives for changing the 
ownership structure of companies and their operations, in order to decrease their 
tax burden. Therefore, allowing the weights to differ across various cost and revenue 
categories can lead to a better fit of the factors in explaining profits.  
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